Miracle to mire, the stagnation of East Asia

Through rapid industrialisation, export strategies and the occasional capital injection from the US, countries like Japan and South Korea achieved staggering growth and development during the latter end of the 20th century.

Today they are significantly advanced economies, with substantial geopolitical influence.

Yet now they face increasing issues of economic stagnation and population decline.

Aspects of demographic change in relation to an ageing population are problems shared by some European countries as well, but for developed East Asia, this is exacerbated by deeper undercurrents of social strife.

Beneath the modern oriental glamour, the conservative nature of these countries has incurred chronic social ills.

Foremost, these countries’ strengths are evident. They have achieved mass cultural exports in the form of arts such as animated media and musical movements.

Take the case of South Korea, where their most popular Kpop group - BTS - contributes roughly $4-5 billion per annum in economic impact.

Japan’s emphasis on cultural soft power has enabled it to purport an image of ‘Cool Japan’, a phenomenon where its societal peculiarities have garnered admiration in the West, something which other countries have struggled to replicate.

Putting this to use, Japan has utilised its soft power (and past key investment links with the US) to establish itself as a strong western ally.

Unfortunately, these advantages help little in alleviating the staggering decline in the populations and birthrates in developed Asia.

In Japan, 30% are aged 65+, with a life expectancy of 84+, South Korea’s population is expected to half by 2100 if its current birthrate of 0.7 per woman perseveres, and in Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, it is only the import of foreign workers that are mitigating the symptoms of these weak fertility rates and burgeoning increase in the eldery.

Healthcare in these countries is generally at an excellent standard, allowing for the positive increases in life expectancy, yet this places higher pressure on public finances.

Elderly populations are notably the most expensive for a government to look after, likely drawing a state-funded pension, healthcare as well as paying little back into the system.

Therefore, a dwindling workforce, already contributing less tax overall, incurs greater tax pressures to maintain a top-heavy population structure - which in turn hampers growth.

Whilst the West has encountered the same problems, more progressive policies towards immigration and family structures means its never reached the same severity as developed Asia.

To make matters worse, there has been no greater symptom of the deep socio-cultural distress than in the 4B/2B movement in South Korea.

Arising back in 2019, the 4B feminist movement is where participants vow to reject four aspects of traditional heteronormative society: no marriage, no dating, no sex, and no childbirth with men.

The softer ‘2B’ subtrend omits the abstinence from dating and sexual intercourse, yet maintains the rejection of childbirth and marriage.

Whilst it has been difficult to quantify these movements’ participation and impact, the socio-cultural phenomenon has made its mark on the internet, often garnering sympathy from typically more liberal feminists in the West.

Its grievances are also clear; the ‘double’ burden, resulting from part/fulltime work whilst also raising children within marriage, is high in South Korea, with a figure of 60% of women back in 2023.

“In developed Asia, persistent patriarchal pressures and weak government support for families (such as limited maternity leave) foster a sense among women that they are being exploited.

Whilst laws are sufficiently generous on paper, company culture often discourages paid leave of absence, resulting in 40% of women reporting career disruption due to childbearing.

Whatever the disparity between what the law permits, and the often unquantifiable impacts of reactionary feminist movements, it is evident that social discontent runs deep.

Facilitation of population growth might be easier with more flexible working practices, yet the entrenched conservative attitudes in Japanese companies have been hard to displace.

A society centralised around gerontocratic respect and lifetime employment has ensured that elderly executives remain secure in their position, whilst newer talent is hindered by nebulous and seniority-based hierarchy.

Even a term exists for the arduous long hours endured by Japanese salarymen - ‘Karoshi’, death by overwork.

The most tragic social ill of all however, is the most concerning symptom of Japan’s workplace issues “karojisatsu” - its suicide rate was 16 per 100,000 people in 2024, and ranks as one of the highest in the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development).

Only South Korea is higher.

These factors have combined to create dismal projections of growth for these two former ‘miracle’ countries in developed Asia.

To alleviate this, government policy could propose a tolerant approach towards immigrant labour, allowing these countries’ to replenish their dwindling tax-paying workforces, although this would require social cooperation from a citizenry whose attitude towards immigration has not always been consistent.

The hardest to tackle however, will be socio-cultural change; until men and women in Japan and South Korea decide its advantageous for them to create families and raise children, then the quintessential foundation for economic growth will continue to dissipate.